Sorting on skills and preferences: Tinbergen meets Sattinger by Dupuy, A.
  
 
Sorting on skills and preferences: Tinbergen meets
Sattinger
Citation for published version (APA):
Dupuy, A. (2011). Sorting on skills and preferences: Tinbergen meets Sattinger. (ROA Research
Memoranda; No. 3). Maastricht: Researchcentrum voor Onderwijs en Arbeidsmarkt, Faculteit der
Economische Wetenschappen.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2011
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
Sorting on Skills and Preferences:  
Tinbergen Meets Sattinger
Arnaud Dupuy
 
Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market | ROA
Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market 
Maastricht University
P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands 
T +31 43 3883647 F +31 43 3884914 
secretary-roa-sbe@maastrichtuniversity.nl  
www.roa.nl
ROA-RM-2011/3
ROA Research Memorandum
Sorting on Skills and Preferences: 
Tinbergen Meets Sattinger
Arnaud Dupuy 
ROA-RM-2011/3*
February 2011
* The ROA Research Memorandum Series was created in order to make research results available for discussion, 
before those results are submitted for publication in journals.
Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market
Maastricht University
P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands 
T +31 43 3883647 F +31 43 3884914 
secretary-roa-sbe@maastrichtuniversity.nl  
www.roa.nl
Abstract
Sorting on Skills and Preferences: Tinbergen Meets Sattinger**
This paper proposes an assignment model where sorting occurs on attributes that are 
simultaneously a skill (Sattinger, 1979) and a preference (Tinbergen, 1956). The key 
feature of this model is that the wage function admits both jobs and workers attributes 
as arguments. Since this function is generically nonlinear (Ekeland et al., 2004), even 
under positive assortative matching, the correlation between the contribution of 
workers attributes to wages and that of jobs attributes can vary from -1 to 1 depending 
on the parameters of the model, i.e. preference, technology and the distribution of both 
sets of attributes. The paper discusses a closed form solution of the model, presents 
conditions for the nonparametric identification of compensating wage differentials and 
nonadditive marginal utility functions using observations from a single hedonic market 
and proposes a nonparametric estimator.
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1 Introduction
Recent emerging empirical literature (e.g. Borghans et al., 2008) has shown the im-
portance of personality traits in economics and in particular for earnings (Bowles
et al., 2001 and Mueller and Plug, 2006). This literature shows that earnings are
related to personality traits like risk aversion or conscientiousness. One possible
explanation for these wage di¤erentials would be that personality traits are linked
to preferences for certain jobsattributes so that the correlation between person-
ality and earnings reects compensating wage di¤erentials for jobs disamenities.
Yet, another explanation would be that personality traits are linked to skills that
enhance productivity on the job and hence lead to higher wages. For instance, the
documented positive e¤ect of conscientiousness on earnings could come about be-
cause conscientiousness enhances workersproductivity or because in equilibrium,
more conscientious workers are mapped onto jobs whose attributes are associated
with negative intrinsic utility (tax controller) and hence require a wage compen-
sation.
The model presented in this paper is the rst to allow sorting to occur on
attributes that each could be simulatenously a skill and a preference. This as-
signment model is concerned with the process by which heterogenous workers,
characterized by a vector of attributes t, are assigned to heterogenous jobs, char-
acterized by a vector of attributes z. In contrast to the existing literature (see
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among others, Tinbergen, 1956, Sattinger 1979, Brown 1980, Hwang et al., 1992),1
each of workers attributes t may be both a skill and a preference and each of
jobsattributes z may be both a productive attribute and a disamenity. In this
type of assignment models, wages reect two compensations that arise simultane-
ously, namely a compensation for the skills supplied and a compensation for jobs
disamenities. This implies that the wage function takes both workersand jobs
attributes as arguments, i.e. w(z; t). In this unied hedonic economy, an equilib-
rium is dened by a mapping of workersattributes t onto jobsattributes z, a
function say mw(z) or mf (t), together with a wage function w(z; t) that depends
on both workersattributes and jobsattributes.
This paper shows conditions under which the compensating wage di¤erential
@w=@z is identied nonparametrically and proposes a nonparametric estimator.
First, it is shown that the mapping function mf (t) is identied nonparametrically
using results from Matzkin (2003). This is a generalization to the unied economy
of Heckman et al.s (2009) result obtained for the Tinbergen class of models. Fol-
lowing the identication of mf (t), a method to nonparametrically identify @w=@z
is proposed. This method relies on imposing shape restrictions on the utility
and production functions. In general, the method requires that i) the production
1Sattinger (1977) developed a compensating wage di¤erential model where workers di¤er in
terms of productivity and jobs in terms of the satisfaction workers receive from working at it, both
unidimensional. Workers and jobs attributes are encompassed in the denition of job satisfaction
and cannot be distinguished from each other. Moreover, all jobs have similar productivity. There
is no complementarity between workers skills and jobs requirements.
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function is additive separable in (z; t i) and ti, with t =< t i; ti >, where the con-
tribution of ti is a known di¤erentiable function r(ti) and ii) ti is a scalar attribute
inuencing job satisfaction. Condition i) insures that @w=@ti(= r0(ti)) is known.
Condition ii) insures that z and hence @w=@z vary with ti. When Conditions
i) and ii) are met, @w=@z is identied from data in a single hedonic market as
@w=@z = dw=dti r
0(ti)
@mf=@t
. A special case is met when ti is a pure preference attribute,
that is, ti a¤ects utility but not productivity, i.e. r0(ti) = 0 for all z and ti. At-
tribute ti is an exclusion restriction in the equilibrium wage function w(z; t) since
it does not a¤ect productivity but not in the equilibrium assignment mf (t) since
it matters for job satisfaction.
The fact that the wage function admits both workersand jobsattributes as
arguments has important implications for empirical applications and in particular
for two noteworthy segments. First, this paper relates to the empirical literature
led by Rosen (1974 and 1986), aiming at estimating compensating wage di¤eren-
tials @w=@z. Assuming, as in Tinbergen (1956), that sorting occurs on preferences
only, the hedonic wage function only depends on z, so that data on wages and
z, i.e. dw=dz, identies @w=@z. However, Brown (1980) recognizes that as soon
as sorting occurs on both skills and preferences, the inability to control for work-
ers full productivity can bias estimates of compensating wage di¤erentials in a
single cross-section and this bias is likely to be large and signicant as shown in
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Hwang et al. (1992). This literature typically assumes that t contains two dis-
joint sets: a set ts of attributes reecting pure productivity and a set tp reecting
pure preferences. The pricing function in this model takes the form w(z; ts) and
the bias arises as soon as part of ts is unobserved in the data. For this reason,
this literature suggests using data sets containing rich information on ts or using
panel data to control for workersxed productivity. Nevertheless, the problem
is more severe in the unied model presented in this paper since each of workers
attributes can be both a skill and a preference. In this economy, wages are given
by the unknown function w(z; t). Even if all attributes in t are observed, without
further assumptions, @w=@z is not identied nonparametrically since for any value
of t, the value of z is uniquely determined by the mapping function mf (t), i.e. we
have dw=dz = @w=@z + @w=@t @mw=@z. The method proposed in this paper to
identify and estimate compensating wage di¤erentials applies to a great generality
of hedonic economies including those studied by Brown (1980) and Hwang et al.
(1992) among others.
This discussion also relates to the literature on the identication and estimation
of preference (technology respectively) parameters in hedonic models using rst
order conditions, i.e. Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004) and Heckman et al. (2010).
This literature has shown conditions under which nonparametric identication of
additive and nonadditive marginal utility models of the Tinbergen class, where
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sorting occurs on preferences only, is possible in a single hedonic market. Their
identication strategy relies on the rst order condition to utility maximization and
builds on results from Matzkin (2003) on nonparametric estimation of nonadditive
random functions. Crucial in this setting is the assumption that the compensating
wage di¤erential @w=@z, the left hand side of the rst order condition, is identied
from data on wages, workersattributes and jobsattributes. In the Tinbergen
class of models assumed in Ekeland et al. (2004) and Heckman et al. (2010),
wages depend only on z so that data on wages and z, i.e. dw=dz, identies @w=@z.
As argued earlier, this is not anymore the case in the unied hedonic economy.
However, the paper shows how the identication results presented in Heckman et
al. follow once @w
@z
is identied using the method proposed in this paper.
The second segment of the empirical literature to which the model contributes
is the literature on earnings regressions using matched employer-employee data,
e.g. Abowd et al. (1999). This literature shows that in an earnings regression
on matched employee-employer panel data, while both workersand rmsxed-
e¤ects correlate positively with measures of rmsproductivity, their correlation
is very low or even negative. The unied hedonic model presented in this paper
o¤ers a natural explanation for this puzzle. Since sorting occurs on both skills and
preferences, wages are function of both workersattributes and jobsattributes.
However, even when sorting exhibits positive assortative matching, the model does
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not imply that the contribution of workersattributes to wages correlates positively
with that of jobs attributes. Both the sign and magnitude of the correlation
between workersand jobsxed-e¤ects will depend on the preference parameters,
the technology parameters and the distribution of workersand jobsattributes.
For instance, suppose that a workers utility decreases with the distance be-
tween her own skills and the level of complexity of her job, as in Tinbergen (1956),
but workersskills and jobscomplexity are complement in production, as in Sat-
tinger (1979). From both Tinbergen (1956) and Sattinger (1979) we know that
in this economy more skilled workers will be assigned to more complex jobs in
equilibrium, i.e. positive assortative matching arises. From Sattinger (1979) we
know that the contribution of skills to wages is increasing in skills everywhere
on the support of skills.2 However, from Tinbergen (1956) we also know that
the contribution of job complexity to wages is only increasing in job complexity
(and hence in skills since there is positive assortative matching) in intervals of job
complexity where job complexity exceeds the skills of the worker matched to that
job. This means that if the distribution of skills dominates the distribution of jobs
stochastically at the rst order, then the contribution of job complexity to wages
is decreasing in job complexity (skills) while the contribution of skills to wages
is increasing in skills. In this case, the correlation between both contributions is
2It is implicitly assumed that almost all workers have positive skills and almost all jobs have
positive complexity. With normal distributions this is the case when the mean of each distribution
is positive and large enough relative to the variance.
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negative even though equilibrium exhibits positive assortative matching.
Using the unidimensional quadratic-normal example, it is shown that one can
calibrate the unied hedonic model so as to generate data where the contribution
of workers attributes to wages and that of job attributes both correlate posi-
tively with rmsproductivity but not with each other. Changing the distribu-
tion of attributes over time induces the type of mobility of workers across rms
that is necessary to identify workersand rmsxed-e¤ects in matched employer-
employee panel data set. It is shown that using this strategy for the unidimensional
quadratic-normal example, one can generate a panel data and estimate workers
and rmsxed-e¤ects that both correlate with rmsproductivity but not with
each other.
The remaining structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the unied
model for the hedonic endowment economy. Section 3 discusses the implication of
the model for the identication and estimation of compensating wage di¤erentials
in a single hedonic market as well as for the literature on rmsand workersxed-
e¤ects in earnings regressions using matched employer-employee data. Section 4
summarizes and concludes.
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2 The unied hedonic endowment economymodel
2.1 Setup
Consider a static labor market where workers match one-to-one with rms. Let
each rm be endowed with a single machine. The supply of machines is therefore
assumed exogenous to the model,3 and the assumption that workers and rms
match one-to-one means that to produce output each machine must be operated by
one and only one worker. Let a machine be characterized by a vector of attributes
denoted by z 2 eZ  Rnz . To x ideas, machines attributes could be the level
of physical strength involved in operating the machine, the level of intellectual
complexity involved, the level of noise generated by the machine, the degree of
risks taken while operating the machine, etc. Let the distribution of machines be
represented by a non-negative Borel measure ez on eZ with total mass ez( eZ).
Similarly, suppose that workers are endowed with a vector of attributes t 2 eT 
Rnt. These attributes could refer to cognitive ability such as physical strength, in-
tellectual ability but also personality traits such as conscientiousness, risk aversion
etc.. Let the distribution of workers be represented by a non-negative Borel mea-
sure et on eT with total mass et(eT ).
3The assumption that rms are endowed with a machine z can be released by supposing that
rms are endowed with a vector of attributes y (investments capacity, managersattributes etc.)
and producetheir machine z. The distribution of machines is then endogenous to the model.
This case corresponds to the hedonic production economy and is dealt with in an appendix
available from the author upon request. The main results of the paper remain unchanged but
the mechanic of the model simplies signicantly by assuming machines are endowed.
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We follow Chiappori et al. (2010) and allow workers and rms to remain un-
matched by augmenting the spaces of workers and rms to Z := eZ [ fZg and
T := eT [ fTg where the isolated points Z and T correspond to the ctitious
partners of unmatched workers and rms respectively. The corresponding aug-
mented measures z := ez( eZ)+et(eT ) + 1 Z and t := et(eT )+ez( eZ) + 1 T
are balanced and normalized to probability measures without loss of generality, i.e.
z(Z) = t(T ) = 1.
In contrast to Tinbergen (1956), Epple (1984), Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004)
and Heckman et al. (2010), the model does not require workersattributes to be
non productive. Let the output of each machine depend on its own attributes
but also on the attributes of the worker operating this machine. Let p(z; t) for
(z; t) 2 eZ  eT be a twice di¤erentiable continuous function indicating the units of
output produced by the pair (z; t). An attribute i is not a productive attribute if
and only if @p(z;t)
@ti
= 0 for all z and t. Note that some attributes may be productive
at some jobs but not at others. While skills of di¤erent types will clearly a¤ect
productivity, some preferences may also a¤ect productivity, for instance, a risk
averse person might also tend to operate a machine slower, conscientious workers
may take better care of their machine, etc.. To ensure that the ctitious rm Z
does not participate, we impose that p(Z ; t) = 0 if t = T and  1 else.
Let w(z; t) for (z; t) 2 eZ  eT be a twice di¤erentiable continuous function in-
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dicating the wage of a worker with attributes t when assigned to a machine with
attributes z and let r(z; t) for (z; t) 2 eZ  eT be a twice di¤erentiable continuous
function indicating the rents of a rm owning machine with attributes z when em-
ploying a worker with attributes t. Note that, by denition, product is exhausted
so that p(z; t)  w(z; t) = r(z; t).
In contrast to Sattinger (1979), the model does not require that jobsattributes
do not a¤ect intrinsic disutility. Assume a quasilinear utility function u(z; t) =
w(z; t) j(z; t) for (z; t) 2 eZ eT where consumption equals wages w(z; t) by assum-
ing no unearned income. Let j(z; t) be a continuous twice di¤erentiable function
capturing job dissatisfaction. For instance, with nz = nt, the function j could take
the specic form proposed by Tinbergen (1956), j(z; t;A) = 1
2
(z   t)0A (z   t)
where A is a positive denite matrix of parameters. A job attribute i does not
provide intrinsic utility if and only if @j(z;t)
@zi
= 0 for all z and t. To ensure that the
ctitious worker T does not participate, we impose that j(z;T ) = 0 if z = Z
and +1 else.
Finally, to allow for non participation, we further impose that w(Z ; t) =
w(z;T ) = w(Z ;T ) = 0 and dene  j(Z ; t) as the reservation utility for
worker t and p(z;T ) as the reservation rent for rm z.
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2.2 Agentsproblem and equilibrium
Each worker chooses the machine z 2 Z that maximizes her utility, that is either
Z or argmaxz2 eZ w(z; t)   j(z; t). The rst order condition to maxz2 eZ w(z; t)  
j(z; t) reads as:
@w(z; t)
@z
  @j(z; t)
@z
= 0 (1)
Assuming that the second order condition for utility maximization, i.e. @
2w(z;t)
@z2
 
@2j(z;t)
@z2
is negative denite, is satised, the implicit function theorem applies so
that there exists a demand function for machines, say z = mw(t), that solves
Equation 1 for z 2 eZ given j(:; ) and w(:; :). Given the wage function w(:; :),
worker t 2 eT chooses mw(t) over Z , i.e. is willing to participate, if and only if
w(mw(t); t)  j(mw(t); t) >  j(Z ; t).
Similarly, each rm chooses the worker t 2 T that maximizes her rents, that is
eitherT or argmaxt2eT p(z; t) w(z; t). The rst order condition tomaxt2eT p(z; t) 
w(z; t) reads as:
@p(z; t)
@t
  @w(z; t)
@t
= 0 (2)
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Assuming that the second order condition for rents maximization, i.e. @
2p(z;t)
@t2
 
@2w(t)
@t2
is negative denite, is satised, the implicit function theorem applies so that
there exists a demand function, say t = mf (z), that solves Equation 2 for t 2 eT
given p(:; ) and w(:; :).4 Given the wage function w(:; :), rm z 2 eZ chooses mf (z)
over T , i.e. is willing to participate, if and only if p(z;mf (z))   w(z;mf (z)) >
p(z;T ).
Let (z; t) be a non-negative measure on Z T that assigns workers and rms
to each other. The support of  is the smallest closed set Spt() 2 Z  T of full
mass (=1).
Denition 1 An assignment  is said to be feasible if and only if (z; t) 2
 (z; t) =

  0 on Z  T j R
Z
d(z; t) = t and
R
T
d(z; t) = z
	
.
The set  (z; t) of feasible assignments is therefore the set of non-negative
measures whose marginals are respectively t and z.
Denition 2 An equilibrium in this economy is a feasible assignment (z; t) 2
 (z; t) and a wage function w(z; t) so that for almost all points (z; t) 2 Spt(),
workers maximize utility and rms maximize rents.
4It is important to note that the rst order conditions determine the slopes and the second
order conditions restrict the curvature of the equilibrium wage function on the intervals of t and
z for which pairs of workers and rms arise in equilibrium. However, nothing is known about
the cross-partial derivative. This suggests that if there exists a solution for the wage function,
this solution will not be unique. All functions satisfying the rst and second order conditions
but with di¤erent cross-partial derivatives will also be solutions. See Section 3.3.
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Note that the support of the equilibrium assignment (z; t) corresponds to the
implicit demand functions mw and mf .
2.3 Existence, Uniqueness and Purity
Chiappori et al. (2010) study the properties of equilibrium in hedonic model of
the Tinbergen class. These results rely on the equivalence between the hedonic
model and the Monge-Kantorovich optimal transportation problem. Denoting
s(z; t) = p(z; t)   j(z; t) the surplus of a pair (z; t), the primal program of the
Monge-Kantorovich transportation problem reads asmax
R
ZT s(z; t)d(z; t) such
that  2  (z; t). The dual program reads as min(U;V )
R
Z
V (z)dz +
R
T
U(t)dt
such that V (z) + U(t)  s(z; t) 8(z; t) 2 Z  T , where U(t) and V (z) can be seen
as the payo¤s of worker t and rm z respectively.
Note that all that matters in the Monge-Kantorovich problem are the proper-
ties of the surplus function s(z; t) and the measures t and z. How this surplus is
formed (i:e: s(z; t) = p(z) j(z; t) in the Tinbergen class or s(z; t) = p(z; t) j(z; t)
in the unied class) and whether the transfer is w(z) or w(z; t) respectively does
not matter. This means that from the perspective of the primal and dual program,
whether one considers the Tinbergen class or the unied class of models is irrele-
vant. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that this distinction is fundamental in
the identication of how the surplus is built up, i.e. productivity and preferences,
15
see section 3 of this paper.
Under the assumption that the surplus function is continuous, Theorem 1 in
Chiappori (2010) applies so that an equilibrium assignment  exists in the unied
hedonic model and there is duality. Moreover, if the surplus function also satises
the subtwist condition dened in Denition 6 in Chiappori et al., then their Theo-
rem 3 applies and there is a unique solution for . If the surplus function satises
the stronger Twisted-buyer condition dened in Denition 5 in Chiappori et al.
2010, then their Theorem 2 applies, so that the unique solution for  is pure.
The proof of the existence of an equilibrium hedonic price function proposed
by Chiappori et al. (2010) essentially follows from the existence of an equilibrium
assignment and duality. Since Chiappori et al. (2010) focussed on the Tinbergen
class of hedonic models w(z; t) = w(z), a formal proof in the case of the unied
economy with w(z; t) is proposed in Appendix 1.
Note however that the solution for w(:; :) is not unique. To see this, let bmw(t)
and bmf (z) be the solutions to the implicit demand for machines and workers. Let
bw(z; t) be a solution for w(z; t). The FOCs yield:
@p(z; bmf (z))
@t
  @ bw(z; bmf (z))
@t
= 0
@ bw(bmw(t); t)
@z
  @j(bmw(t); t)
@z
= 0
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Totally di¤erentiating the FOCs with respect to z and t respectively and rear-
ranging yields (dropping the arguments of all functions for notational convenience):
@ bmf
@z
=

@2p
@t2
  @
2 bw
@t2
 1
@2 bw
@z@t
  @
2p
@z@t

(3)
@ bmw
@t
=

@2 bw
@z2
  @
2j
@z2
 1
@2j
@z@t
  @
2 bw
@z@t

(4)
since @
2p
@t2
  @2 bw
@t2
and @
2 bw
@z2
  @2j
@z2
are negative denite hence invertible from the SOCs.
It is easy to show that for all (z; t) 2 eZ  eT , one could change the values of
@2 bw
@z@t
, @
2 bw
@t2
and @
2 bw
@z2
in such a way that the right hand sides of Equation 3 and 4
remain unchanged and the SOCs are still satised. This means that even when
bmf and bmf are unique, the solution for the wage function is not unique.
This result is of importance for the identication of @w
@z
presented below. One
of the conditions for identication reads as: @
2j
@z@ti
6= @2w
@z@ti
for some scalar ti. Since
we have multiple solutions, we can always pick one satisfying this condition.
2.4 Quadratic-normal example
Let nz = nt = n and let workersattributes be normally distributed with mean
vector t and variance-covariance matrix t and let z be normally distributed
with mean vector z and variance-covariance matrix z. Suppose that, as in
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Tinbergen (1956) job dissatisfaction is dened as j(z; t;A) = 1
2
(z   t)0A (z   t),
where A is a positive denite matrix of preference parameters. Suppose further
that productivity is given by p(z; t;E) = b0 + b0z + c0t + 12z
0Bz + 1
2
t0Ct + t0Dz
and where b0 is a constant, b and c are vectors and B, C and D are matrices
of parameters. The parameters contained in D indicate the extent to which the
attributes of machines complement or substitute workersattributes, i.e. @p(z;t;E)
@z@t
=
D.
As noted earlier by Tinbergen (1956) and Epple (1984), when attributes on
both sides of the labor market are normally distributed, linear mapping func-
tions of the form t = 0 + 1z equilibrate supply and demand, i.e. t = 0 +
1z and t = 
0
1z1. The solution for 1 that maximizes total surplus is

 1=2
z


1=2
z t
1=2
z
1=2

 1=2
z if D + A > 0 and 0 = t   1z.5
It is easy to show that the rst order conditions also yield linear mappings if
and only if w(z; t) is quadratic: say w(z; t) = 0 + 
0t+ 1
2
t0t+ 0z + 1
2
z0z.6 The
FOCs read as:
5Note that the power p, p 2 R, p 6= 0, of a square matrix A of size n  n is obtained as
ApX = Xdiag() where X is a matrix of size n n formed of the n eigenvectors of A and  is
the vector containing the corresponding eigenvalues. If in addition A is symmetric, then X is
orthogonal so that X 0X = XX 0 = I and, post-multiplying both sides by X 0, the result simplies
to Ap = Xdiag ()pX 0. The matrix Ap will be real if and only if all eigenvalues  are real and
strictly positive that is if and only if A is positive denite. Since t and z are symmetric, the
above result applies to  1=2t and 
1=2
z . (See Bosch, 1987)
6We choose the solution for the wage function that is additive separable in z and t.
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+ (  A) z =  At (5)
   c+ (  C) t = Dz (6)
These are linear functions and the reduced form solution will be of the form
t = mf (z) = 0 + 1z or z = mw(t) =   11 0 +  11 t. Plugging t = 0 + 1z
into 5 yields  =  A0 and  = A(I   1). Plugging z =   11 0 +  11 t into
Equation 6 yields  = c D 11 0 and  = C +D 11 .
To illustrate the model, the closed form solution of the unidimensional quadratic-
normal model is programmed in Mathematica. For a given set of parameters, this
program illustrates the equilibrium with a panel of three graphics: 1) the equi-
librium mapping function in the (z; t) plan, 2) the equilibrium compensation for
skills and the equilibrium compensation for jobs disamenities and 3) the distribu-
tion of workersand jobsattributes. The command Manipulate enables the user
to visualize instantaneously the impact of changing structural parameters of the
model on the equilibrium through these three graphics.7 As an example, Figure 4
was generated for z = 1, t = 4, z = 1, t = 0, and c = 10, C =  1, D = 3
and A = 3.
7This program is available from the author upon request.
19
3 Implications for empirical applications
3.1 Identication and estimation of compensating wage
di¤erentials in a single hedonic market
3.1.1 Identication
Since the seminal work by Rosen (1974), the traditional approach to estimate pref-
erence parameters, the function j(z; t),8 has consisted of two steps. In the rst
step, using market data on wages and jobsattributes, one estimates the wage func-
tion applying the functional form that ts best the data. In the second step, one
uses the rst order condition in Equation 1 together with the compensating wage
di¤erential derived from the rst step, i.e. dw(z)
dz
, to recover preference estimates
of j(z; t).
Early literature by Brown and Rosen (1982), Epple (1987), Bartik (1987) and
Kahn and Lang (1988) has argued that j(z; t) cannot be identied in a single
hedonic market unless an arbitrary nonlinear marginal utility is assumed. Recently,
Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004) have shown that nonlinearity is a generic feature
of the hedonic model, not an arbitrary choice, and Ekeland et al. (2002 and 2004)
and Heckman et al. (2010) have provided conditions under which nonparametric
identication of additive and nonadditive hedonic models of the Tinbergen class
8All techniques below apply also to the estimation of productivity parameters by symmetry.
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is possible in a single hedonic market.
These conditions build on results from Matzkin (2003) on nonparametric esti-
mation of additive and nonadditive random functions. All the results from Ekeland
et al. and Heckman et al. crucially depend on the assumption that dw
dz
identies
@w
@z
. In the Tinbergen class of models, where wages depend only on z, identication
of @w
@z
follows by assumption, dw
dz
= @w
@z
. However, in the unied economy, wages are
given by the unknown function w(z; t) so that dw
dz
= @w
@z
+ @w
@t
t0. Without further
assumptions, @w
@z
is not identied nonparametrically since for any value of t, the
value of z is uniquely determined through the mapping function z = z(t).
The method proposed in this paper to identify @w
@z
relies on shape restrictions
on the production function p(z; t). Following Ekeland et al. and Heckman at al.,
assume that z 2 eZ  R is a scalar and t =< to; tu >2 eT o  eT u = eT where to is at
least a scalar but potentially a vector of observed attributes and tu 2 eT u  R is
an unobserved (to the econometrician) scalar attribute. Assume further that tu is
independent of to. The identication method requires rst an identication of the
mapping function z = mw(to; tu). Lemma 3 is a generalization of the identication
proof provided in Heckman et al. (2010) to the unied model.
Lemma 3 If @
2j(mw(to;tu);t)
@z@tu
  @2w(mw(to;tu);t)
@z@tu
< 0 (or > 0), the mapping function
z = mw(t
o; tu) is identied in the unied hedonic model.
Proof. See Appendix 1:
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Note that since the solution for w(:; :) is not unique, we can always choose a so-
lution so that @
2j(mw(to;tu);t)
@z@tu
6= @2w(mw(to;tu);t)
@z@tu
. Once the mapping functionmw(to; tu)
is identied, we can proceed to the identication of @w
@z
. The following theorem
shows that imposing some shape restrictions on the production function p(z; t)
allows us to identify @w
@z
.
Theorem 4 Let there be a scalar attribute toi so that i)
@j(mw(to;tu);t)
@z@toi
6= @2w(mw(to;tu);t)
@z@toi
and ii) p(z; t) = q(z; to i; t
u) + r(toi ) where r(:) is a known di¤erentiable function.
Then for any (z; to; tu), the function @w
@z
is identied.
Proof. From the rst order condition to rents maximization we have:
dw
dtoi
 @w
@z
@mw
@toi
+
@w
@toi
=
@w
@z
@mw
@toi
+ r0
Moreover, from Lemma 3, @mw
@toi
is identied. Is @mw
@toi
6= 0? Consider the rst
order condition to utility maximization. We have @w(mw(t);t)
@z
  @j(mw(t);t;A)
@z
= 0.
Totally di¤erentiating with respect to toi and rearranging obtains:
@mw
@toi
=
@2j
@z@toi
  @2w
@z@toi
@2w
@z2
  @2j
@z2
since by assumption the second order condition to utility maximization is sat-
22
ised, i.e. @
2w
@z2
  @2j
@z2
< 0.
From @
2j(mw(to;tu);t)
@z@toi
  @2w(mw(to;tu);t)
@z@toi
6= 0 we have @mw
@toi
6= 0 and it follows that,
@w
@z
is identied as:
@w
@z
=
1
@mw
@toi

dw
dtoi
  r0

An important special case is met when r(toi ) is a constant. This occurs when
toi is a pure preference attribute,
@p(z;t)
@toi
= r0(toi ) = 0 for all z and t
o
i . This means
that toi plays the role of an exclusion restriction in the wage equation. Attribute
toi is an argument of the mapping function z(:) but not of w(:; :). As it turns out,
the stronger requirement for this special case (analytically speaking) seems to be
more likely to be met in real data. The general analytical setting indeed requires
having measures of productivity at the individual level which is rarely available.
Practitioners should therefore concentrate on nding a pure preference attribute.
As for Lemma 3, note that since the solution for w(:; :) is not unique, we can
always choose a solution so that @j(z;t)
@z@toi
6= @2w(z;t)
@z@toi
. Hence, the rst requirement of
Theorem 4 is without loss of generality.
All the identication results presented in Heckman et al. (2010) follow once
@w
@z
is identied. For instance, assuming that to is a vector and the distribu-
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tion of tu is known, the identication strategy of Theorem 3.1 in Heckman et
al. (2010) is to impose that @j(z;t)
@z
= g(q(z; to1); t
o
2; t
u) where to = hto1; to2i 2
eT o1  eT o2 = eT o, for some unknown continuous function g : R  eT o2  eT u ! R
and known continuous di¤erentiable function q : eZ  eT o1 ! R. Let Q(to2; tu) =
fx 2 Rjfor some to1, q(mw(to; tu); to1) = xg. Let (x; to2; tu) be such that (to2; tu) 2
eT o2  eT u and x 2 Q(to2; tu). By the denition of Q(to2; tu), there exists to1 2 eT o1 such
that q(mw(to1 ; t
o
2; t
u); to1 ) = x. Then g(x; t
o
2; t
u) =
@w(mw(to1 ;t
o
2;t
u);(to1 ;t
o
2;t
u)
@z
from the
rst order condition to utility maximization. It follows that for all (z; to; tu) such
that q(z; to1) = x 2 Q(to2; tu), we have:
@j(z; t)
@z
= g(q(z; to1); t
o
2; t
u)
=
@w(mw(t
o
1 ; t
o
2; t
u); (to1 ; t
o
2; t
u)
@z
3.1.2 Estimation
Since the estimation results presented in Heckman et al. (2010) follow once we
have estimated @w
@z
, this paper focuses on the estimation of @w
@z
and refers the reader
to Heckman at al. (2010) for the estimation of j(z; t). To present the problem in
terms of random functions, let W , T o, Z be the observable variables of our model
and let T u be the unobservable variable. All variables are of dimension 1 except
T o that has dimension of at least 1. Let our model be W = w(Z; (T o; T u)) where
w is an unknown function continuous and twice di¤erentiable in Z and (T o; T u)
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respectively. The function w is assumed to belong to the set of functions derived
from the unied economy outlined above. Let FTu(:) be the distribution of T u and
let FW;Z;T o(:;w0; F 0Tu) be the joint distribution of the observable variables when
w = w0 and F 0Tu = FTu . Assume that T
u is independent of T o. Our data consist
of a sample of N draws of W , Z and T o from a single hedonic market.
To estimate @w
@z
, we need rst to estimate the mapping function. From the
proof of Lemma 3 we know that mw(to; tu) is strictly increasing in its last argu-
ment and since by assumption T u is independent of T o, we can use normaliza-
tion results from Matzkin (2003) estimate mw(to; tu) from the conditional dis-
tribution of Z with respect to T o. If FTu is known we recover mw(to; tu) as
F 1Zj;T o(FTu(t
u)) and if not, we normalize the mapping function so that for some to
and all tu we have mw(t
o
; tu) = tu and estimate FTu(tu) = FZjT o=to(t
u) and hence
mw(t
o; tu) = F 1ZjT o=to
 
FZjT o=to(t
u

). Estimates of z are obtained by replacing the
true distributions F by their kernel estimators bF following the denitions provided
in Matzkin (2003) or in Heckman et al. (2010), in the above equalities. Denote
bmw(to; tu) the estimated mapping function. Theorem 4 suggests the following es-
timator c@w
@z
of @w
@z
for any to i; t
o
i ; t
u:
d@w
@z
=
1
@ bmw
@toi

dw
dtoi
  r0

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where dw
dtoi
is the observed wage di¤erential as toi changes and using the known
function r to calculate r0.
3.2 Literature on matched employer-employee data
This model makes interesting predictions with respect to the empirical literature
estimating earnings functions using matched employer-employee panel data, e.g.
Abowd et al. (1999). This literature typically nds that while both workersand
rmsxed-e¤ects positively correlate with measures of rmsproductivity, the
correlation between the two components of wages is low or even negative. While
Shimers (2005) unidimensional assignment model with coordinative frictions could
generate low or even negative correlation if frictions are large enough,9 the unied
model presented above predicts that a frictionless economy could also be char-
acterized by a low or negative correlation between the contribution of workers
attributes to wages and that of jobsattributes even though both contributions
positively correlate with measures of rmsproductivity and sorting exhibits pos-
itive assortative matching. The key features of the unied hedonic model that
makes these predictions possible are: 1) that sorting occurs on both skills and
preferences and 2) the generic nonlinearity of the wage function (see Ekeland et
al., 2004).
9Recent empirical literature, e.g. De Melo (2009), Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) and Lise,
Meghir and Robin (2009), argues that in an economy with search frictions, the correlation be-
tween the estimated employer and worker xed e¤ects may be misleading.
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To illustrate this result, consider the unidimensional quadratic-normal unied
hedonic economy, nz = nt = 1. Let t be the skill level of workers and let z be the
level of jobscomplexity. Let A > 0 so that workers have a preference for jobs of
complexity corresponding to their skills level. Let D > 0 so that workersskills
complement jobscomplexity in production. It is further assumed that b, c, B, C
and D are so that production increases in t and in z for almost all pairs (z; t).
Since A + D > 0, we have 1

=
q
t
z

> 0, so that this economy is charac-
terized by positive assortative matching.
The production of a rm with job z when matched with worker mf (z) = 0 +
1z is given by p(z;mf (z)) = constp+(b+1 (c+ 0C) + 0D) z+
 
B
2
+1
 
C
2
1 +D

z2
where constp = b0 + c0 + C2 
2
0. Using the solution  =  A0,  = A(I   1),
 = c D 11 0 and  = C +D 11 and after some simplications, obtains:
w(z; t) = 0 + #(t) + (z) (7)
where #(t)   c D 11 0 t+ 12  C +D 11  t2 is the wage contribution of work-
ersattributes and (z)   0Az+ 12A(1 1)z2 is the wage contribution of jobs
attributes.
Replacing t by 0 + 1z, the contribution of workersattributes to wages is
given by #(mf (z)) = const# + 1 (c+ 0C) z + 12 (C1 +D) z
2 where const# =
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0
 
c+ 0
2
 
C +D 11

.
The three measures of interest are:
p(z;mf (z)) = constp + 
pz +pz
2
#(mf (z)) = const# + 
#z +#z
2
(z) = const + 
z +z
2
where 
p = b+1 (c+ 0C)+0D, p = B2 +1
 
C
2
1 +D

, 
# = 1 (c+ 0C),
# =
1
2
(C1 +D), const = 0, 
 =  0A and  = A2 (1  1).
The question arises whether we can calibrate the parameters of the model so
that COV (#; p)  0, COV (; p)  0 and COV (#; ) = 0 with the constraints
that A+D > 0 and hence 1 > 0. These three conditions read as:
COV (#; p)  0, 
p
# z
V (z2)
+ (p
# +#
p)
COV (z; z2)
V (z2)
+ p#  0
COV (; p)  0, 
p
 z
V (z2)
+ (p
 +
p)
COV (z; z2)
V (z2)
+ p  0
COV (#; ) = 0, 

# z
V (z2)
+ (
# +#
)
COV (z; z2)
V (z2)
+ # = 0
Note rst that one would not be able to satisfy these three conditions if
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#(mf (z)) and (z) were linear functions of z. For these conditions to be satis-
ed we need #(mf (z)) and (z) to be nonlinear functions of z.
Note also that COV (z; z2) and V (z2)merely depend on z and z so that these
three conditions are governed by 10 free parameters, i.e. z, z, b, B, c, C, D, A,
1 (or t once z is given) and 0 (or t once z and 1 are given) suggesting
an innity of solutions to the problem. However, it seems appropriate to restrict
the domain of the parameters to ensure absolute advantage of workers and rms
that is 1) more skilled workers are more productive in all jobs, 2) more complex
jobs are more productive independently of the type of the worker. Formally these
conditions read as:
@p(z; t;E)
@t
= c+ Ct+Dz > 0 for almost all t and z
, c > min
z;t
( Ct Dz)
and
@p(z; t;E)
@z
= b+Bz +Dt > 0 for almost all t and z
, b > min
z;t
( Bz  Dt)
Since z and t are normally distributed their support is the real line. For the
conditions above to be met for almost all t and z would require c and b to be
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innitely large. Instead, the conditions are imposed for all t within 2 standard
deviations from the mean and all z within 2 standard deviations from the mean.
Formally we impose:
c >  C

t   l  2
p
t

 D

z   2
p
z

where l =
 1 if C < 0
1 else
b >  B

z  m 2
p
z

 D

t   2
p
t

where m =
 1 if B < 0
1 else
As it turns out, even with these additional restrictions imposed on the pa-
rameters, one can easily calibrate the model so as to generate COV (#; p)  0,
COV (; p)  0 and COV (#; ) = 0. For instance, the calibration reported in
Table 1, shows, for a sample of 5000 rms and workers, that COV (#; p) = 0:93,
COV (; p) = 0:40 and COV (#; ) = 0:04.
One can even go further and generate not just one cross section of wage data
but several successive cross-sections. Provided there is enough mobility of workers
across rms in the data, one would then be able to estimate rmsand workers
xed-e¤ects using rmsand workersidentity and wages as in Abowd et al. (1999).
The problem in hedonic models is to generate the kind of mobility necessary
to identify these xed-e¤ects. The solution is to either let the distribution of jobs
or the distribution of workers change over time. As either distribution changes
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over time, the mapping function changes (remember that 1 =
q
t
z
and 0 =
t 1z) which as the e¤ect of shu­ ing the identity (dened by t) of the worker
assigned to each rm (identity dened by z) over time.
In the following example, ve successive years of data are generated for an
economy of 5000 rms and 5000 workers and the parameters are calibrated as in
Table 1. The required mobility is generated by successive increments of magnitude
0:05 in t, i.e. t increases from  0:04 to 0:16, keeping the variance of skills and
the distribution of jobs constant over time. In each cross section the assignment
of workers to rms is dened by t = 0 + 1z and wages are determined as
0+#(mf (z))+(z)+e where e a random error that follows a normal distribution.
Note however that since the parameters of the equilibrium wage function depend
on 0 = t   1z that varies over time, the shape of the wage function also
changes over time. The wage equation in year y can be re-written as:
wy(z; t) = 0y + #y(t) + y(z) + ey
= 0y + #(t) + (z) +  y(t) + y(z) + ey
where  y(t) = #y(t)  #(t) and y(z) = y(z)  (z)
The terms #(t) and (z) are respectively the mean wage contribution of work-
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ersattributes t and the mean wage contribution of rmsattributes z. The work-
ers xed e¤ects estimate #(t) whereas the rms xed e¤ects estimate (z). As
is well-known in this literature, identication of workersand rmsxed-e¤ects
is only possible within connected groups of workers and rms (see Abowd et al.,
2002). Such a group contains all the workers who ever worked for any rm in the
group and all the rms at which any worker in the group were ever employed.
Given the generated panel data, that contains information on wages, rmsiden-
tity and workersidentity in ve successive years, workersand rmsxed-e¤ects
are estimated using the a2reg Stata command (see Ouazad, 2008) on the largest
connected group (selected using the a2group stata command). This group contains
4706 di¤erent rms and 4706 di¤erent workers observed on average in 3.3 years.
Denote b# and b the estimated xed-e¤ects of workers and rms respectively.
Estimation results show rst that the estimated rmsand workersxed-e¤ects
are highly correlated with their respective true e¤ects (COV

#; b# = 0:98 and
COV (; b) = 0:68). Second, we nd a negative correlation between the esti-
mated rmsand workersxed-e¤ects, i.e. COV
b#; b =  0:27 (true correla-
tion is COV (#; ) = 0:01), whereas both sets of xed-e¤ects correlate positively
with rmsproductivity, i.e. COV
b#; p = 0:87 (where COV (#; p) = 0:94) and
COV (b; p) = 0:21 (where COV (; p) = 0:23).
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4 Conclusion
This paper unies the two classes of models within the sorting literature. The
model nests both Tinbergens model of sorting on job preferences and Sattingers
model of sorting on productivity. Under the assumption that all jobsattributes
lead to intrinsic disutility but workersattributes do not a¤ect productivity the
model collapses to Tinbergens model. Workers care about their job satisfaction
but are equally productive at all jobs. This means that the wage function does not
depend on workersattributes but merely on jobsattributes. Opposite to this,
under the assumption that all workersattributes contribute to productivity but
no jobsattributes lead to intrinsic disutility the model collapses to Sattingers
di¤erential rents model. Workers do not care about job satisfaction, only about
their wage, but workers with di¤erent attributes are unequally productive. This
means that the wage function does not depend on jobs attributes but merely
on workersattributes. In the more general case depicted in the unifying model,
workers do care about jobs satisfaction and productivity does depend on workers
attributes. As a result, the wage function has both workersand jobsattributes as
arguments. An example of closed form solution is provided when productivity and
job satisfaction are quadratic and attributes on both sides are normally distributed.
The model has implications for the identication and estimation of i) compen-
sating wage di¤erentials (see Rosen 1974 and 1987) and ii) preference (technology
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respectively) parameters in hedonic models (see Ekeland et al., 2002 and 2004,
and Heckman et al., 2010). In the unied economy where sorting occurs on at-
tributes that are simultaneously a skill and a preference, wages are given by the
unknown function w(z; t). Without further assumption, @w
@z
is not identied non-
parametrically since for any value of t, the value of z is uniquely determined by
the mapping function z = mw(t). This paper rst shows in Lemma 3 that the
mapping function z(t) is identied nonparametrically using results from Matzkin
(2003). Lemma 3 generalizes Heckman et al.s (2010) results to the unied hedo-
nic model. Using the identication result for mw(t), this paper shows conditions
under which @w
@z
is identied nonparametrically in Theorem 4. These conditions
impose shape restrictions on the production function p(z; t). In particular, the
method assumes that p(z; t) = q(z; t i) + r(ti) where r(:) is a known di¤erentiable
function and with t =< t i; ti > and where ti is a preference attribute, i.e. so
that @j(z;t)
@z@ti
6= @2w(mw(to;tu);t)
@z@toi
. A special case is met when ti is a pure preference
attribute, that is, ti a¤ects utility but not productivity, i.e.
@p(z;t)
@ti
= 0 for all z
and ti. Attribute ti is an exclusion restriction in w(:; :) since it does not a¤ect
productivity but not in mw(t) since it matters for job satisfaction.
The model is exible enough to allow the correlation between the contribution
of workers attributes to wages and that of jobs attributes to vary between -1
to 1. This correlation depends on preference parameters, technology parameters
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and the distribution of workers and jobsattributes. The model therefore provides
an explanation for Abowd et al.s (1999) puzzling nding of a low or even nega-
tive correlation between workersand rmsxed-e¤ects in wage regressions using
matched employer-employee data that does not require (large) frictions (Shimer,
2005). The key features of the unied hedonic model that makes this prediction
possible are: 1) that sorting occurs on both skills and preferences and 2) the generic
nonlinearity of the wage function (see Ekeland et al., 2004).
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Appendix 1:
Proof of the existence of an equilibrium wage function w(z; t). Let
w : Z  T ! R satisfy:
U(t) + j(z; t)  w(z; t)  p(z; t)  V (z) (8)
The left hand side of this inequality is the minimum willingness of worker t to
accept job z while the right hand side is the maximum willingness of rm z to pay
for worker t:
Take a feasible triple (; U; V ) and suppose that (U; V ) solves the dual program
so that V (z) + U(t)  s(z; t) = p(z; t)  j(z; t). Rearranging obtains:
U(t) + j(z; t)  p(z; t)  V (z) for (z; t) 2 Z  T (9)
Suppose also that  solves the primal program so that from the duality we haveR
ZT s(z; t)d(z; t) =
R
Z
V (z)dFz(z) +
R
T
U(t)dFt(t). It follows that:
Z
ZT
s(z; t)d(z; t) =
Z
ZT
(V (z) + U(t))d(z; t)
since
R
Z
d(z; t) = t and
R
T
d(z; t) = z. This yields s(z; t) = V (z) + U(t) for
 almost every (z; t). Consider a worker t that is matched with a rm z. We
40
have s(z; t) = V (z) + U(t) and hence:
U(t) + j(z; t) = w(z; t) = p(z; t)  V (z) (10)
From our choice of w(z; t) in Inequality 8 we haveU(t) + j(z; t)  w(z; t)
for worker t and z 2 Z and w(z; t)  p(z; t)   V (z) for rm z and all t 2 T .
Rearranging and using Equation 10 obtains:
p(z; t)  w(z; t)  V (z) = p(z; t)  w(z; t) 8t 2 T (11)
w(z; t)  j(z; t)  U(t) = w(z; t)  j(z; t) 8z 2 Z (12)
It follows that t maximizes p(z; t)   w(z; t) and z maximizes w(z; t)  
j(z; t). Since the equalities in 11 and 12 hold for  almost every (z; t) and 
exists, there exists a solution (; w) to the unied hedonic model.
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider the rst order condition to utility maximiza-
tion, @w(mw(t);t)
@z
  @j(mw(t);t;A)
@z
= 0. Totally di¤erentiating with respect to tu and
rearranging yields:
@mw
@tu
=
@2j
@z@tu
  @2w
@z@tu
@2w
@z2
  @2j
@z2
Using the second order condition to utility maximization, we have @mw
@tu
> 0
41
if @
2j
@z@tu
  @2w
@z@tu
< 0. The mapping function is strictly increasing in tu. There-
fore, mw(to; tu) is identied using normalization results from Matzkin (2003) and
assuming that to and tu are independently distributed.
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Table 1: A calibration of the unidimensional quadratic-normal unied hedonic
model.
Parameters COV (p; #) COV (p; ) COV (#; )
0:93 0:40 0:04
A 8:00
c 40:80
C  1:00
b 260:44
B  45:44
D 8:00
z 5:00
1 1:40
=> t 9:80
z 0:15
0  0:25
=> t  0:04
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